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Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and 
Moral Limits of the Paradigm 
ANITA L. ALLEN• 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Paul M. Schwartz's article, Internet Privacy and the State, 1 
poses two of the most important normative questions contemporary privacy 
theorists should be asking and attempting to answer. The first question is 
how, if at all, can we secure meaningful forms of privacy while remaining 
appropriately accountable to others? The second question is what role, if 
any, should the state play in the regulation of personal privacy? Professor 
Schwartz's effort to answer these questions implicitly aims at locating 
comfortable ground between the polar domains of extreme, unrecon­
structed liberalism on the one hand and anti-liberal communitarianism or 
civic republicanism on the other? Schwartz's "liberal" defines privacy as 
control over personal information and is biased in favor of private sector 
self-regulation. His "communitarian" and "republican" are deeply skepti­
cal of individual privacy and prt·'v>acy rights as threats to the common good 
and civic virtue. Schwartz defends an intermediate stance that falls some­
where between liberalism and communitarianism. Like a liberal, he ac­
cepts privacy as a vital good and civil liberty.3 However, like a communi­
tarian or civic republican, he redefines privacy as what he terms a "consti­
tutive value."4 Schwartz believes individual privacy protection in some 
contexts is a paramount public interest, and embraces a degree of state in­
tervention to create and reinforce beneficial privacy norms.5 Thus, his 
* A.k.a., Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania 
School of Law; JD., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., University of Michigan. 
1. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815 (2000). 
2. Professor Schwartz defines his position through a critique of communitarians and republicans, 
whom he groups together for these purposes, and free market liberals. See id. at 836. 
3. Cf Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the 
Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REv. 751,777 (1999) (assessing the impl ications of Profes­
sor Schwartz's desire to treat data protection as a civil liberty). 
4. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 816. 
5. See id. at 8 16-17. 
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general answer to the first question (about accountability) is that, for the 
sake of forming a good society and shaping our identities, our society 
should value privacy and undertake "line-drawing along different coordi­
nates to shape permitted levels of scrutiny.'x; His answer to the second 
question (about state regulation) is that the state has an affirmative role to 
play in the correction of information market failures and limiting prefer­
ence falsification.7 
I would like to comment on just one important aspect of Professor 
Schwartz's thoughtful article: his rejection of the popular view that privacy 
policy should seek to protect individuals' control over personal informa­
tion.8 Professor Schwartz observes that the "leading paradigm on the 
Internet and in the real, or, offline world, conceives of privacy as a per­
sonal right to control the use of one's data."9 According to Schwartz, this 
privacy-as-data control paradigm (which he calls the "privacy-control" 
paradigm for short and which I will attempt to clarify below) "seeks to 
place the individual at the center of decision-making about personal infor­
mation use."10 Schwartz was right to take on the privacy-control assump­
tion, for the reasons he gives and for additional reasons I will supply here. 
I maintain that the popularity of the privacy-control paradigm is problem­
atic because there are a number of conceptual, practical, and moral limits to 
its plausibility. We liberals-! count myself as one11-are attracted to the 
paradigm because it complements our focus on the interests of individual 
persons as moral agents, but we m_ust concede its limitations and consider 
alternatives. After clarifying the privacy-control paradigm in Part I, I will 
identify its conceptual limitations in Part II, practical limitations in Part III, 
and moral limitations in Part IV. I conclude, with Professor Schwartz, that 
alternatives to the privacy-as-data control paradigm are needed to guide our 
urgent philosophical and policy understandings of privacy and its protec­
tion in the age of the Internet. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVACY -CONTROL PARADIGM 
In a book aimed at the lay public, Ann Cavoukian and Don Tapscott 
identity several understandings of privacy but assert that: "An important 
component of protecting privacy is maintaining control over information 
6. !d. at 834. 
7. See id. at 817. 
8. See id.at816. 
9. !d. at 820. 
10. !d. 
11. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723 (1999) [hereinafter Allen, 
Coercing Privacy]; see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE 
SOCIETY (1988) [hereinafter ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS). 
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that is circulating about you-informational privacy."12  The view that pri­
vacy is importantly or essentially about control over personal information 
is promulgated in recent publications aimed at scholars and professionals.1 3  
Focusing on current efforts to design policies that accommodate informa­
tional privacy concerns in cyberspace, Professor Schwartz concludes that 
the "leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or offline world, con­
ceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one's data."14  He 
calls this paradigm "privacy-control" and describes the "weight of the con­
sensus about the centrality of privacy-control" as "staggering."15 In fram­
ing the problematic privacy-control paradigm for his critique, Schwartz 
understands the paradigm to encompass a set of views about the definition 
of "privacy," requirements of the "right to privacy," and the ideal aims of 
privacy policy. In this section, I would like to clarify the parameters of the 
privacy-control paradigm with which Schwartz takes issue and the extent 
of its popularity. 
Adding precision to Schwartz's presentation of the paradigm, I want to 
suggest that the paradigm he identifies is comprised of three complex, dis­
tinguishable, and severable notions. They are, first, the notion that the term 
"privacy" means control (or rights of control) over the use of personal data 
or information; second, the notion that the expression "right to privacy" 
means the right or claim to control the use of personal data or information; 
and, third, the notion that the central aim of privacy regulation should be 
promoting individuals' control (or rights of control) over personal data or 
information. When I say that each notion is complex, I mean that each of 
the three is amenable to detailed analysis that would reveal ambiguities too 
subtle to interest most lawyers. When I say that each is distinguishable, I 
mean that each one is a semantically distinct proposition from the other 
two. And when I say that each is severable, I mean that, while logically 
consistent with the others, neither notion logically entails the other two. 
So, for example, a person who believes that "privacy" means data control 
might also believe, with complete logical consistency, that privacy regula­
tion should not have as its central aim promoting individuals' control over 
personal data or information. Moreover, a person who believes that "pri­
vacy" means data control and that "the right to privacy" means the right to 
data control, is not logically committed to the beliefs that there is or should 
12. ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN A 
NETWORKED WORLD 9 (1997). 
13 . See, e.g., Jerry Bennan & Deidre Mul l igan, Prtvacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 
NOVA L. REv. 549, 557 n.11 (I 999). To that end, the authors rely on Alan Westin's much-quoted 
definition of privacy as control over infonnation in his work Prtvacy and Freedom. See generally 
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS 
OF CYBERSPACE 143 (1999) ("Privacy, as Ethan Katsh defines it, is the power to control what others 
can come to know about you."). 
14. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 820. 
15.  Jd. 
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be a right to privacy, and that privacy regulation should aim at rationally 
optimizing or otherwise promoting "informational self-determination 
through individual stewardship of personal data."16 
The three aforementioned data-control notions form a paradigm be­
cause they are complementary, not because they are mutually entailing. 
They are complementary in the significant sense that, individually and as a 
group, they cohere with liberal moral, political, and legal perspectives that 
emphasize wide sway for individual autonomy. However, the data-control 
paradigm is neither necessarily embraced in full by all liberals, nor rejected 
in full by all non-liberals. As explained below, a liberal could reject a 
definition emphasizing data control in favor of a broader definition of "pri­
vacy" or of the "right to privacy."17 In addition, a liberal might easily re­
ject individual data control as the central goal of privacy policy in key 
regulatory regimes, such as laws regulating medical or financial informa­
tion. Finally, a non-liberal could also hold the notion that "privacy" means 
data control. Indeed, a communitarian could agree with a liberal that "pri­
vacy" means control of personal data, but disagree about what rights of 
privacy to recognize and what level of privacy protection society ought to 
afford. 
Schwartz asserts that the consensus about the privacy-control paradigm 
is "staggering." I, too, am struck by the proliferation of the paradigm in 
the privacy literature spawned by cyberspace. Yet, there is less overall 
consensus among privacy theorists than Schwartz acknowledges about at 
least one of the three notions comprising the paradigm. When it comes to 
the meaning or definition of "privacy" there is not as much consensus 
about the identification of privacy with control over information as 
Schwartz represents.18 On the contrary, there is no universally accepted 
philosophical definition of "privacy." I attribute wide variation in defini­
tional accounts of privacy "to the confluence of three factors: (a) variation 
in the use and denotational and connotational meanings of 'privacy;' (b) 
variation in the purposes for which definition of 'privacy' is undertaken; 
and (c) variation in approaches taken to the task of definition itself. "19 
To be sure, a number of prominent policy analysts and theorists em­
ploy the idea of control in their definitions of what privacy and the right to 
privacy mean. Sometimes the term "control" is used expressly in a defini­
tion of privacy, as where Charles Fried describes privacy as "control we 
16. !d. 
17. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
18. Cf Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Trans­
formed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 153 
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) ("The pursuit of a single definition of privacy has preoc­
cupied so many travelers in this field that the quest has become a standard challenge in the privacy 
field."). 
19. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 5. 
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have over information about ourselves."20 Sometimes the concept is pres­
ent without the term, as where Alan Westin wrote of the "claim of indi­
viduals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others."21 The 
concept of control even figures into accounts of privacy that go beyond 
informational privacy to include physical, decisional, and proprietary 
senses of the term. Hence, Richard Parker characterized privacy as "con­
trol over who can sense us,"22 and Tom Gerety defined privacy as "auton­
omy or control over the intimacies of personal identity."23 Since defini­
tions of privacy vary with the purpose for definition,24 these largely liberal­
minded legal, social, and moral theorists defined privacy in terms of con­
trol to complement their further view that just government and ideal social 
practices should promote individual control over personal data. As previ­
ously noted, communitarian critics of liberalism and liberal conceptions of 
privacy might also define privacy as individual control over personal in­
formation, for purposes of emphasizing the privacy sacrifices of accessi­
bility and disclosure demanded of participation in responsible communi­
ties. 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL LIMITS OF THE DATA-CONTROL PARADIGM 
One must acknowledge that many theorists have flatly rejected defini­
tions of "privacy" that equate privacy with control over personal data?5 
While some of the theorists who reject the control-emphatic definition have 
done so as part of an effort to supplant liberalism, even liberals have re­
jected control-based definitions of "privacy." Theorists reject defining 
"privacy" as control or rights of control for a number of reasons that point 
to the conceptual limitations of the entire privacy-control paradigm itself. 
For starters, some theorists, including liberal theorists, reject the notion 
that "privacy" is best defined as a right, viewing it instead as a claim of 
right.26 Others reject defining privacy as either a right or a claim of right, 
20. Charles Fried, Prtvacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,482 (1968). 
21. WESTfN, supra note 13, at 7. 
22. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RlJJGERS L. REv. 275, 281 (1974). 
23. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233,236 (1977). 
24. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 6. 
25. They have similarly rejected definitions that define privacy as control over routes of observa­
tion, control over routes of accessibility, control over decision-making, and control over identity. See 
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 18. 
26. Cf Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: 
AN ANTHOLOGY 346, 348-49 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed. , 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY] (asking whether "privacy [is] a right, a claim, a form of control, a value?" 
and answering that it is a "neutral" state of affairs). 
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arguing that privacy is a set of cultural values and practices.27 Still others 
present privacy as a factual condition or state of affairs that rights of pri­
vacy, privacy claims, and cultural practices potentially protect.28 
Theorists also reject control-based definitions on the ground that they 
are too narrow. These theorists insist on defining "privacy" broadly, to 
better capture patterns of actual usage. The actual contemporary usage of 
"privacy" in the United States is particularly broad. "Privacy" can mean 
informational privacy, but also physical, informational, and proprietary 
privacy.Z9 When Americans describe abortion rights, the right to die, and 
gay rights as protective of privacy they are not just talking about the right 
to control personal data. They are talking about a degree of freedom from 
unwanted intervention, decisional autonomy, and freedom of choice gener­
ally. When Americans say they want "privacy" they may be interested in 
conditions of solitude, the need for repose, or the seclusion needed for in­
timacy rather than control over facts about themselves. Data control as a 
general definition of "privacy" is implausible because it simply ignores 
common meanings. As a stipulative definition or a description of what 
many people worry about in the context of online communications, "data 
control" has more plausibility. However, even for purposes of discussing 
issues in cyberspace, there appear to be good reasons for rejecting control­
emphatic definitions of privacy. A concept other than control may more 
adequately capture the sense of "privacy" at issue in online contexts. One 
such candidate is the concept of inaccessibility. 
An examination of the philosophical literature that seeks to define pri­
vacy and its value reveals that the privacy-as-control definitions so popular 
with the data protection community are not the kinds of definitions of pri­
vacy that have attracted the largest following among philosophers.30 In-
27. See Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRJVACY, supra note 26, at 300, 310 ("Privacy is a social practice. It involves a complex of behaviors . 
. . . ") . 
28. I include myself in this group. See generally ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, Chapter 
I. 
29. I distinguish and elaborate these four dimensions of privacy. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Pri­
vacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFI­
DENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 34 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (Briefly, informational privacy 
concerns are about access to personal information; physical privacy concerns are about access to per­
sons and personal spaces; decisional privacy concerns are about governmental and other third-party 
interference with personal choices; and proprietary privacy concerns are about the appropriation and 
ownership of interests in human personality.). 
30. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note II, at 11. As I have written: 
Restricted-access definitions have identified privacy with a limitation on others' access to 
the individual; the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others; lack of ac­
cess to information related to intimacies; selective control over access to oneself or one's 
group; an existential condition of limited access to an individual's life experiences and en­
gagements; the state of limited access by others to certain modes of being in a person's life; 
a limitation on access of one or more entities to an entity that possesses experiences; and as 
the exclusive access of a person to a realm of his own. Privacy as a political ideal has been 
interpreted in restricted access terms as an individual's freedom to secure conditions free 
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deed, as recently as a dozen years ago, definitions emphasizing accessibil­
ity and inaccessibility were arguably more pervasive than control-based 
definitions. On these theories, other than in contexts in which "privacy" 
holds its decisional and proprietary meanings, privacy refers to a degree of 
inaccessibility of a person or information about her to others' five senses 
and surveillance devices. I have been an advocate of such a view in the 
past.31 
The best conceptual reason for rejecting characterizations of privacy 
that emphasize control may be that control over personal data appears to be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for states of privacy to obtain. Suppose 
people had perfect control over personal data about themselves. Would 
they necessarily have privacy? The answer is surely no. Having control 
over personal information does not mean having privacy. The person in 
control of her data might elect to share personal information with others. 
We have seen a lot of this in the age of cyberspace. For example, a couple 
announced plans to lose their virginity live over the Internet to underscore 
its special importance to them.32 A nurse chose to broadcast her double 
mastectomy live over the Internet to educate the public about breast 
cancer.33 A married woman choose to share the delivery of her third child 
with other expectant parents by delivering her baby live over the Internet.34 
Women have chosen to use "adult entertainment" Web sites to sell images 
of themselves engaging in sexual intercourse or sexually explicit 
fantasies.35 Like "Jenni," men and women have chosen to train Web video 
cameras on the interiors of their dwellings and then sell or give away real­
time images of their daily lives.36 
from unwanted access. The concept of private affairs has been explained as being those ac­
tivities and concerns of an individual that ought to be protected by limited access. Finally, 
group privacy has been defined in terms of restrictions on others' access to one's group. 
/d. at 11 (footnotes omitted). 
In the intervening ten years, some philosophers of privacy have been critical both of control and 
access oriented understandings of privacy. See, e.g., PATRlCIA BOLING, PRJVACY AND THE POLITICS OF 
INTIMATE LIFE (1996); JULIE C. INNESS, PR1VACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992). 
31. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 3. 
32. See Don Feder, Innocence Lost in Net Fishbowl, BOSTON HERALD, July 22, 1998, at  029, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bherald File. 
33. See As Part of Breast Cancer Awareness Month, the Health Network Will Webcast Live Mas­
tectomy and Breast Reconstruction Surgery, HEALTH NETWORK (Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www .ahn.com 
!Press_ Release/press_ display . asp?idocid=4667>. 
34. In June 1998, a woman who revealed her name only as "Elizabeth" gave birth live over the 
Internet to "Baby Sean" in the Arnold Palmer Hospital in Orlando, Florida The mother declared her 
motives to be public education. See Ellen Goodman, Internet Birth a Blow to Privacy, BUFFALO NEWS, 
June 20, 1998, at 3C, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bufuews File. 
35. See Jack Boulware, Web Rouser: Former Lusty Lady Dancer Caity McPherson Struggles to 
Make a Living on the Oversexed Internet, NEW TIMES SF WKL Y. ,  Mar. 31, 1999, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, New Times SF Wkly. File; Michael Saunders, Web's Red-light District Shines in Tech­
nology, Profits, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1998, at C7, available in LEXIS, News Library, BGlobe File. 
36. See Jennicam (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www . jennicam.com>. The initial screen of the 
Web site, visited November 16, 1999, reads like a dictionary entry which defines Jennicam as "a real-
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lenni's Web stardom provides a good illustration of the disconnection 
between privacy and data control. Because Jenni is free to tum her camera 
off and close down her Web site, she is free to exercise the partial capacity 
she shares with most other Americans to control access to personal infor­
mation about the details of her home life and, to that extent, to restore her 
privacy. But as long as the camera is feeding images of her to others and 
others are watching, she has no physical privacy to speak of, and others 
possess otherwise private information about her home life. That Jenni has 
control of the camera does not mean that she has privacy. In fact, what 
makes Jenni, Ana, and similar web performers popular is the fascination 
we have with people who are willing to forego the usual domestic privacies 
for public amusement or reflection. Control is not sufficient for privacy, 
nor is it necessary. A prison inmate locked in solitary confinement has 
privacy-too much of it-but no control over personal information, since 
prison officials can enter his quarters or perhaps access surveillance camera 
images of him at will.37 The kind of mandatory privacy the inmate experi­
ences is not a form of privacy most people would want for themselves. Yet 
most of us approve of at least some forms of punitive or disciplinary soli­
tary confinement in the context of criminal corrections, and sometimes 
voluntarily isolate ourselves from others. 
Defining "privacy" as data control directs our attention to the questions 
of consent and choice.38 But if what people in control are choosing and 
consenting to is making themselves informationally and physically more 
accessible to others, the states of affairs they are bringing about are not 
privacy, but the opposite of privacy. Physical and informational privacy 
time look into the real life of a young woman " and "an undramatized photographic diary for public 
viewing esp. via Internet. " !d. The site claims that cameras show the bedrooms, living room, and 
dining room of lenni's home, and promises a roving camera soon. Jennicam membership costs $15 for 
a 12-month subscription. Non-members can visit the Jennicam Gallery, a sample of images, showing 
photographs of lenni's feet, eyes, nude back, and torso, plus Jenni bathing, caressing a lover in bed, 
entertaining a gathering of friends, and working at her desk. 
37. Compare what Ferdinand Schoeman has written: 
Privacy has been identified also as the measure of control an individual has over: 1. infor­
mation about himself; 2. intimacies of personal identity; or 3. who has sensory access to 
him . . . . [This definition] presents some difficulties . . . .  [It] . . .  seem[s] particularly vul­
nerable to a number of counterexamples. We can easily imagine a person living in a state of 
complete privacy but lacking control over who has access to information about him . . . .  To 
take another example, a person who chose to exercise his discretionary control over infor­
mation about himself by divulging everything cannot be said to have lost control, although 
he surely cannot be said to have any privacy. 
Ferdinand Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 1, 2-3; cf CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 19 (1999) ("Both the 
prison and the concentration camp deprive inmates of freedom, but the tearing away of every shred of 
privacy is what deprives them of dignity and causes them to surrender their hold of the sense of self."). 
38. It also draws our attention to the concept of "data," which invites us to conceive of personal 
information from the distinctively utilitarian perspective of one for whom the information has value 
only to the extent that it can be packaged in standardized and bureaucratically manipulable formats. 
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entail a degree of inaccessibility.39 Informational privacy obtains where 
information actually exists in a state of inaccessibility, whether it is locked 
in a file drawer, computer, or in someone's mind. Anonymity, confidenti­
ality, reserve, and secrecy-not merely having the choice to bring these 
about-are forms of privacy. People who could enjoy privacy and are in 
control of personal information are choosing to give up privacy. It is for 
this reason that commentators troubled by people deciding to broadcast 
otherwise intimate or confidential conduct over the Internet have begun to 
ask the question whether it is possible to invade your own privacy.40 You 
can invade (that is diminish) your own privacy the same way you can di­
minish your own freedom. In the era of slavery, it was not said that the 
free man who sold himself into slavery remained free because servitude 
was his choice, and we should not say that a private person who voluntary 
gives up privacy remains private. And just as the moral and policy impli­
cations of voluntary servitude have troubled us, so too, should the moral 
and policy implications of voluntary loss of privacy. 
III. 1HE PRACTICAL LIMITS OF THE DATA-CONTROL PARADIGM 
To the argument in Part II that conceptual limitations burden the pri­
vacy-control paradigm, I now add the argument that there are practical 
limits. In explaining conceptual limits, I focused on the privacy-control 
paradigm's definitional notion that "privacy" means data control, and sug­
gested that privacy is open to broader and more perspicacious definitional 
analysis, as the philosophical literature reflects. In explaining practical 
limits, I begin by focusing on the privacy-control paradigm's notion that 
rights of privacy are rights of data control. Here, I suggest that Professor 
Schwartz's concerns about whether people can actually control personal 
data are well-taken. It is pointless (or merely symbolic) to ascribe a right 
to data control if it turns out that exercising the right is impossible. 
Professor Schwartz stresses the practical difficulties attending the no­
tion that controlling personal data is the basis of a meaningful right, in cy­
berspace or offline. Control over personal information is an illusion, he 
argues. Typical Internet users disclose a great deal of information.41 They 
do so directly and knowingly as they purchase goods and services or send 
e-mail. They do so less directly and knowingly as their travels through 
cyberspace deposit cookies,42 and as firms with whom they do business 
39. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 11, at 13-18. 
40. See Margaret Talbot, Candid Camera, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct . 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, Newrpb File. 
41. See generally THOMAS A. PETERS, COMPUTERIZED MONITORING AND ONLINE PRIVACY 196-
310 (1999). 
42. As Reginald Whitaker has written: 
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Schwartz's case against the right to control data has both a practical argu­
ment-privacy is inefficient-and a moral side--privacy is irresponsible. 
Even if data control were possible and practical, it could be argued that for 
moral reasons people ought not to be ascribed a right to data control, and 
that enhancing individual control over personal data is not morally worthy 
as a central objective of privacy regulation. 
IV. THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE DATA-CONTROL PARADIGM 
The privacy-control paradigm can obscure that in so many policy con­
texts it is wrong to insist on individual control over personal data. One 
policy concern is that people will want too little privacy. That is, that they 
will use rights of data control to give up forms of privacy deemed vital to 
their interests. This concerns militates against designing privacy policies 
focused solely on enhancing control over personal data by individuals. 
Doing so may be neither in their interests nor in the interests of the greater 
society. Liberals have generally assumed that privacy is something people 
want and that the main goal of public policy is to enhance their capacity to 
get what they want. This effort to maximize choice is problematic though, 
if it turns out that people are choosing to give up more privacy than is con­
sistent with liberal conceptions of the person or the liberal way of life. 
Unless people want privacy, neither government nor private sector 
policies aimed at individual data control and individual stewardship of per­
sonal information can insure privacy. People who ascribe to legal rights 
and entitlements to control personal data may choose to share more data 
than they conceal. They may prefer disclosure for the sake of monetary 
profit, artistic creation, public education, medical care, commercial trans­
actions, entertainment, or community. Policy-makers may proceed on the 
basis of one of two assumptions: (1) the anti-paternalist assumption that 
personal privacy is a good only to the extent that people want it (and there­
fore that it should not be forced on people); or (2) the paternalist assump­
tion that personal privacy is a good, even for those who do not want it (and 
therefore that efforts should be made to alter preferences or to coerce pri­
vacy). The idea of "coercing privacy" sounds strange, but is really quite 
familiar.45 Certain laws already mandate privacy, such as the (popular) 
laws that require that clothing be worn in public places and the (much criti­
cized) regulations that prohibit military service members from disclosing 
their sexual orientation. The building codes that regulate the design and 
placement of residential housing also mandate privacy. A Manhattan 
builder does not have the option of constructing an apartment building en­
tirely of transparent glass. !vlany social norms that fall short of law that 
once coerced privacy have eroded in recent years, giving way to openness 
45. See generally Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note ll, at 723. 
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about matters of health, sexuality, and opinion. The culture of "exhibi­
tionism and voyeurism" is evidence of this erosion. To aggressively pro­
tect privacy, policy-makers may be required to adopt policies that require 
certain privacies, want them or not. They may be required to undertake the 
formative project of creating citizens who want certain personally and so­
cially beneficial forms of privacy. 
The privacy-control paradigm obscures the need for concern that peo­
ple will want too little privacy, and also the concern that people will want 
too much privacy. A sense of moral responsibility for one's conduct and a 
desire for morally responsive public policies might lead to abandonment of 
enhancing individual data control as the central objective of privacy policy. 
For example, the demands of responsible employment place a moral limit 
on policies that might purport to give workers greater control over personal 
financial and health information. To take another example, it might seem 
innocuous to make the assertion that people should be able to control per­
sonal financial data, until one realizes that our political obligations to our 
country and fellow citizens make that impossible. As James Rule and 
Lawrence Hunter have observed, "if governments are expected to tax in­
come or commerce . . .  citizens can hardly expect control over information 
about their personal finances."46 It would seem unwise to prohibit the con­
stitutionally mandated decennial census-takers from collecting personal 
information about household income. Welfare, Social Security, disaster 
relief, student loans-all of these public benefits should be available, but 
surely require moral accountability in the form of personal financial disclo­
sures. 
The area of health care delivery and medical record privacy is a good 
one to examine for purposes of exposing the weaknesses of a privacy­
control paradigm. Medical privacy is important. Many people have felt a 
need to conceal their bodies and information about the condition of their 
bodies and minds, particularly when they are ill and aging. Moreover, it is 
important to many people that they or someone they designate make some 
of the key decisions about the context and scope of health care and disclo­
sures. The central aim of medical record policy cannot be to give individu­
als complete control over medical inforn1ation. Information sharing is a 
sine qua non of modem health care delivery, and also a bureaucratic re­
quirement of insurance. The twin demands of confidential disclosure to 
health providers and accountability to insurers entail that the individual 
cannot control personal medical data once he or she decides to seek profes­
sional care. To speak of controlling medical data is also problematic be­
cause of the difficulty of concealing health matters from family, friends, 
co-workers, and even strangers. If a woman discovers a lump in her breast, 
46. James Rule & Lawrence Hunter, Towards Property Rights in Personal Data, in VISIONS OF 
PRIVACY, supra note 44, at 168, 169-70. 
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she can control the time and place that information about her tumor is 
shared with others. However, the list of medical conditions that are plainly 
visible to others is extremely long: alcoholism, jaundice, Alzheimer' s, 
Parkinson's, psoriasis, deafness, tuberculosis, and skin cancer cannot be 
concealed. The interests we have in medical privacy are best addressed by 
focusing less on the misleading ideal of controlling medical information, 
and more on the wider concerns of, first, the social norms of civility, re­
spect and responsibility (that help us manage the medical information we 
possess about ourselves and others), and second, fair information 
practices47 (such as informed consent, patient access to records, limited 
dissemination by providers and insurers, and the accuracy and security of 
records and systems of records, that health providers, insurers and others 
ethically and accountably gather, maintain, and share personal information 
entrusted to them). 
These moral qualms about the "privacy control" paradigm do not entail 
that complete custody of personal data should be uncritically yielded in 
every case to police and government agencies. Nor do moral qualms about 
the importance of willingness to share information entail that e-commerce 
should be conducted with no attention to consumer information privacy 
interests. However, they are meant to suggest that because personal infor­
mation cannot and should not be substantially controlled by individuals, 
privacy enhancing technologies should be thought of as just that privacy 
enhancing, not privacy controlling, technologies. They are also meant to 
suggest that because it is both misleading and wrong to hold up "privacy 
control" as such a policy aim, something very different and more complex 
than data-control is the realistic aim of e-commerce and marketing privacy 
policies. Precisely defining this "something very different" is one of the 
most challenging tasks on the table for privacy policy theorists. Professor 
Amitai Etzioni is content to call it balancing individual and entity interests 
in light of the common good.48 Professor Schwartz tries to get at this al­
ternative to data control when he points to the need to think of privacy con­
stitutively and to understand that respect for it requires contextual line­
drawing. 
What would Schwartz's suggested approach look like in practice? I 
imagine this. Consider the case Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States 
JRS.49 Wine Hobby was the seller and distributor of avocational equipment 
for the making of wine. The company wished to market its products to an 
47. See Mary 1. Culnan & Robert J. Bies, Managing Privacy Concerns Strategically: The Implica­
tions of Fair Information Practices for Marketing in the Twenty-First Century, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY, 
supra note 44, at 6, 149 (introduction listing the fair infonnation practices about which there is emerg­
ing international consensus, and article elaborating an expansive understanding of such policies). 
48. See AMIT AI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY ( 1 999). 
49. 502 F.2d 1 33 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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individual wine hobbyist, and filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)50 
request for a copy of the list of persons registered (as required by law) with 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as producers of wine for 
"family use." The government responded, claiming that the information 
could not be disclosed because of Exemption 6 of the Act, which excludes 
from the coverage of the Act "personnel and medical and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
privacy."51 The court found for the government. It did not, however, as­
sert that citizens have a right to control personal information, rather, it de­
scribed the need to balance competing interests. In explicating the family 
wine-makers' privacy interests, the court focused on American cultural 
traditions of family and domestic privacy-that is, on constitutive privacy 
norms. The idea that citizens have an absolute right to control personal 
information is contradicted by the mandatory government wine production 
reporting requirement itself. The government's registration regulation de­
nied persons a right to control information sufficient to exclude govern­
ment. However, the family-privacy protecting interpretation of FOIA in 
this case construes government as a confidant rather than a broadcaster. 
The sense of privacy is offended by having others load our mailboxes with 
solicitations and advertisements based on information about our habits and 
avocations obtained as a result of a mandatory reporting requirement. The 
government that makes us accountable for taxation due on potentially lu­
crative wine production also limits access to personal information that we 
yield reluctantly and for which othe-rs have considerably less than a com­
pelling need. Important to a constitutive conception of privacy is what 
Schwartz calls the "pattern of knowledge" represented by public disclosure 
of registered family wine producers' identities to third parties intending 
commercial usage. Although our common identities as participants in a 
free and open society support the goal of open records embodied in FOIA, 
and our needs as a market economy include cheap information, the bound­
ary around the family home endorsed by the court is also one Schwartz 
could support. For while it is Professor Schwartz's view that we must 
avoid the "data fortress that isolates personal information in some absolute 
sense,"52 we also must avoid a way of life that turns our desire to know 
what government is up to into a way of life that will permit fellow citizens 
to know what we as law-abiding citizens are up to in our homes and family 
lives. 
50. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III 1997). 
5 1. /d. §552(b)(6) (exception for personnel and medical and similar files). 
52. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 834. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The appeal of the privacy-control paradigm is the appeal of the idea 
that privacy protection, virtually by definition, is all about vesting control 
over personal information in the individual.  I have attempted to clearly 
outline the conceptual, practical, and moral limits of the privacy-control 
paradigm that embodies this  facially appealing idea. I elaborated the para­
digm as consisting of the three severable notions that "privacy" means per­
sonal data control or rights of data control; that the right of privacy is a 
right of personal data control ;  and that enhancing personal data control by 
individuals is the optimal end of privacy regulation. Recognition of the 
limits of the paradigm must lead serious adherents to respond with efforts 
to repair or replace it. 
